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THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
SCHOOL INTEGRATION: A LAWYER'S VIEw
Howard C. Westwood*
The most important single point highihted in this Symposium is the
fact that thousands and thousands of sincere people in the South actually
believe that it is possible to defy the Supreme Court, that they need only
hold out against compliance, even against the least compromise with the
Court's orders, and the threat of school integration will pass away. What is
most needed for the solution of the integration problem is an understanding
by these sincere people that a delusion has been foisted upon them.
To this end the legal profession has a heavy responsibility. If it standi
by in silence while demagogues mock the supremacy of the law, the pro-
fession will forfeit its claim to respect. If it slinks away from the issue, it
will have betrayed every precept that entitles it to be treated as a profession.
Defiance of tthe Court, when it is rationalized (if ever it is), rests upon a
claim that a state has the right to determine for itself what the Constitution
means. Whether pursued with the "legalism" of interposition or massive re-
sistance or with the crudity of mob violence, it amounts in the end to the
assertion that there is a point where a state can insist upon its own view of the
mandates of the Constitution, the agencies of federal power to the contrary
notwithstanding.
Lawyers - who are supposed to know our legal and political history
rather better than most people - recognize that this assertion became a
delusion a century ago. It is a proposition which was fought out and settled
in the Civil War.
There is a popular conception that the war raged over slavery.1 That
misses the real point of the war, blinking its most pertinent lesson.
While the war, of course, settled the slavery issue,' there was but a
small minority in the North who, in 1861 before the firing on Sumter, would
have voted to abolish slavery.' Very probably a large majority of the people
* Member of the bar of the District of Columbia and of the State of New York, Partner in
the firm of Covington & Burling, Washington, D.C.
1 James F. Rhodes is typical of Northern historians of the post-Civil War generation who claimed
that slavery was the fundamental cause of the War. RHODES, LEcTuREs ON THE AmaERICAN CIvIL
W~AR (1913). This view still prevails in some circles. See SCHLESINGER, The Causes of the Civil War:
A Note on Historical Sentimentalism, 16 PARTISAN RaV. 969-81 (1949).
2 Wiley, The Memorable War, 53 Mo. HISTORICAL Ray. 99, 104 (1959).
8 The 1860 Republican platform included the following plank:
Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially
the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according
to its own judgment exclusively, is essential....
In his first inaugural address, Lincoln quoted this plank in support of his declaration that he had no
right or inclination "to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists." 6
NrcoLAY & HAY, COmPLETE WORKS OF ABRAmm LINCOLN 170 (1905).
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of the North really did not much care one way or the other about the slavery
question.4 And in the states that seceded, there was a large percentage of
people - perhaps even a majority - who felt that slavery was undesirable
and should be abolished in due course.5
The real issue of the war was the right of constitutional self-determination
by a state when it felt that other states or the federal power had trespassed
upon its rights, or threatened to do so. This asserted right was founded on the
view that the Constitution was a compact among sovereign states rather than
an act of the people of the nation, that the states had not relinquished their
independence but had merely banded together under an inter-state agreement
to provide a joint machinery of federal government for dealing with mutual
concerns.6 Most clearly, under this view, agencies of the federal government,
the mere instruments of the sovereign states, could not impose their views of
the compact upon a disagreeing state if that state wished to insist upon its
rights.7
Prior to 1861 this constitutional position was eminently respectable. It
was not even peculiarly Southern. On the very eve of the war - in 1859
the Wisconsin legislature adopted a resolution proclaiming:
... that the Government formed by the Constitution of the United
States was not made the exclusive or the final judge of the extent of the
powers delegated to itself; but that as in all other cases of compact
among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right
to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure
of redress.
8
This view of the state of the "Iron Brigade" was precisely the same as the
constitutional views of Jefferson Davis and of Alexander Stephens. 9
Nor was Wisconsin unique in its support of the constitutional views of
the Southland. In the seventy years between the founding of the Union and
the formation of the Confederacy there had been repeated episodes indicat-
4 Moderate statesmen such as Douglas and Lincoln had no strong feelings over the issue of
slavery. They were in fact against granting political and social equality to the Negro race. See
MuNFoRD, VmGINIA'S ATITUDE TOWARD SLAVERY AND SECESSION 167-68 (1909). Wiley points out
that "Letters and diaries of Union soldiers indicate that very few - no more than one in ten - of
those who wore the blue were fighting primarily for the emancipation of slaves." Wiley, supra note 2,
at 104.
5 SMrrH, THE BORDERLAND IN THE CIVIL WAR 31-32 (1927); Munford, op. cit. supra note 4 at
82-103. It is at least interesting that the Confederate Constitution contained a much stronger
prohibition against the importation of slaves than did the United States Constitution. 1 DAVIS, RIsE
AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 261-62 (1881).
6 Id. at 134-40, 146-56; 1 STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF mHE LATE WAR BETWEEN THE
STATES 51-59, 116-70, 441-46 (1868).
7 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 141-46; STEPHENs, op. cit. supra note 6, at 419-76.
8 JOURNAL OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF WISCONSIN, SESSION 1859, 863-65. This resolution was
adopted as a protest against a Supreme Court decision which reaffirmed the constitutionality of the
Federal Fugitive Slave Law. An abolitionist had been convicted of a violation of the Fugitive Slave
Law in the federal court, but this was nullified by a habeas corpus proceeding in the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin which discharged the prisoner from the custody of the Federal authorities, In re Booth,
3 Wis. 13 (1855). The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the state court and
remanded the prisoner to federal custody. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859). It is notable that
the portion of the Wisconsin resolution quoted in the text was taken, almost verbatim, from the
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798. Infra, note 10.
' STEPHENS, op. cit. supra. note 6, at 419-76.
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ing a real question as to the ultimate supremacy of the federal power and
particularly that of the Supreme Court.'"
The necessary implication of the right of self-determination was the
right of secession." Indeed, there was considerable logic in the view that
secession was the only means for vindicating the right - that as long as a
state remained in the Union, and therefore a party to the compact, it should
abide by the determinations of federal agencies.
It is no wonder, therefore, that the mere assertion of the right of
secession - and the actual fact of secession - did not suffice to call the
10 The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, anticipating a Supreme Court ruling up-
holding the Alien and Sedition Laws, asserted that neither state would consider such decision binding.
The first of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, was one of the earliest
statements of this doctrine. It stated:
"Resolved, that the several States composing the United States of America, are not united on the
principle of unlimited submission to their government; but that by compact under the style and
title of a Constitution for the United States and amendments thereto, they constituted a general
government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving
each State to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever
the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no
force: That to this compact each state acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States
forming, as to itself, the other party: That the government created by this compact was not made
the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would have
made its discretion, and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers; but that as in all other
cases of compact among parties having no common Judge, each party has an equal right to judge
for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress." FoereR, BAsic WRmNGs OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 326 (1944).
It was in the Virginia Resolutions that Madison first expounded the doctrine of interposition. The
third Resolution stated: "That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare that it views the
powers of the Federal Government as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties, as
limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further
valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that, in case of a
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the
States, who are parties thereto, have the right and in duty are bound to interpose for arresting the
progress of the evil, maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties
appertaining to them." 6 THE WRITINGs OF JAs MADIsoN 326 (Hunt ed.) Also see Report on the
Resolutions, Id. at 341-406.
In 1814 New England similarly proclaimed State supremacy. The unpopular war of 1812 and the
stoppage of commerce intensified the discontent of the New England States with the Federal Govern-
ment. The Hartford Convention, composed of representatives from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode
Island, New Hampshire and Vermont, adopted resolutions that repeated the gist of the Virginia
Resolutions of 1798. They declared: "In case of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of
the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty of a State, and liberties of the people; it is not only the
right but the duty of such a State to interpose its authority for their protection. . . . When Emer-
gencies occur... States, which have no common umpire, must be their own judges, and execute their
own decisions." See public documents containing proceedings of the Hartford Convention of
Delegates, as quoted in 4 CHANING, HISTORY OF THE UNrED STATES 556 (1936).
In 1828 the South Carolina legislature adopted an "exposition" which declared the right of a state
to nullify federal laws that it regarded unconstitutional. When the Tariff Act of 1832 reaffirmed the
objectionable protectionist features of the 1828 Act, South Carolina carried the doctrine to its
logical conclusion and, in a state convention assembled for the purpose, passed an Ordinance of
Nullification which declared that the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 were "null, void and no law" and not
"binding upon this state, its officers or citizens." SYDNoR, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHERN SECTIONAL-
IsM 1819-1848, at 203-15 (1948).
See generally 5 ScHLasiNGER, The State Rights Fetish, POINTS IN AMmucAN HISTORY 220-43 (1922).
Also, for a review of instances of state opposition to Supreme Court decisions, see the address of
J. Lee Rankin, Solicitor General, delivered before the Pittsburgh Regional Meeting of the American
Bar Association on Mar. 13, 1959. Jefferson Davis also cited several "northern precedents" for
state resistance to federal action in his book. 6 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5, at 70-76.
11 "Who was to be the umpire.. .? Not the United States Government, for it was the creature of
the States, it possessed no inherent, original sovereignty. . . . The umpireship is, therefore, expressly
on the side of the States, or the people. When the State of South Carolina, through a sovereign con-
vention, withdrew from the Union, she exercised the umpireship which rightly belonged to her, and
which no other could exercise for her." 2 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 16.
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North to arms. On the contrary, a great editor of the New York press had
counseled that the erring sisters should be allowed to depart in peace.
12
Throughout the North there was much sympathy for the South. As recently
as 1858 Jefferson Davis had been received in Boston with "enthusiasm ...
which defies description," when he spoke in Faneuil Hall - and he spoke, by
the way, in defense of the South's stand on slavery.13
The sympathy which the South found in the North was by no means
confined to a sympathy with its constitutional theory. There was a very real
sympathy, too, with its deep feeling of the Negro's inferiority.' 4 Lincoln's
own State of Illinois had adopted a Constitution by vote of the people in
1848, Article VI, Section 1 of which denied suffrage to Negroes, and
Article XIV, Section I of which directed the state legislature to pass at its
first session under the new constitution effective laws to prevent Negroes
from immigrating to the state.15 A series of such laws followed, and in 1853
an act was passed "to prevent the immigration of free negroes into this state."' 6
In 1862 the constitutional convention incorporated the provisions of this
statute into Article XVIII of the proposed constitution.' 7 This article was
submitted to the popular vote separately from the body of the constitution.
Although the proposed constitution was rejected by over 16,000 majority,
Article XVIII was supported by a majority of 100,590. This was barely a
month before Lincoln's first Emancipation Proclamation. 8 One of the great
difficulties faced by southern slaveholders in their efforts to free their slaves
and provide them a place to live in dignity and comfort had been the cruel
attitude of many northern communities which refused their resettlement.'9
And it was Abraham Lincoln himself who said, not once but often, in his
debates with Senator Douglas, that he did not favor either social or political
equality for the black race, that he would deny the Negro even the right to
vote.2 9
How, then, could the war have come?
It came because a relatively small number of extremists, some in the
North and some in the South, with incredible foolishness, insisted upon every
jot and tittle of their respective positions in defiance of federal power and
constitutional obligation.
Consider first the foolishness of the northern extremists.
12 HORNER, LINCOLN AND GREELEY 188-89 (1953), quoting the New York Tribune of Nov.
9, 1860.
13 The Boston Morning Post, Oct. 12, 1858, quoted in STRODE, JEFFERSON DAVIS 1808-1861, at
310 (1955).
14 Negroes were subjected to various forms of civil, social and political discrimination in the
northern states - even in such "Yankee" strongholds as Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. MuNFoR, op. cit. supra note 4, at 169-70.
15 Verlie, Illinois Constitutions, 13 ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL LanRARY COLLECTIONS 78, 98
(1919).
16 2 WILLIAMs, HISTORY OF NEGRO RACE IN AMERICA 123 (1883).
17 JouRNAL OF THE CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1862, 692-93, 1098 (1862).
18 2 MosEs, ILLINOIS, HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL 658; MUNFORD, op. cit. supra note 4, at 171-72.
19 In at least the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Oregon, either by constitutional provisions
or statutes, immigration or settlement of Negroes was specifically prohibited. MUNFORT, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 170-73.
20 NICOLAY AND HAY, op. cit. supra note 2, vol. 3, p. 29; vol. 4, p. 318; vol. 5, p. 142.
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Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution provided that a
fugitive slave "shall be delivered up on claim" of the slave's owner. Yet with
state personal liberty laws (cf. "massive resistance") and even with mob
violence (cf. Little Rock) enforcement of the Constitution often was frus-
trated in the Northern States.2 It was this constitutional violation that gave
the South its clearest justification for assertion of its right of secession as a
remedy for breach of the compact by the Northern parties thereto.22
South Carolina seceded on December 20, 1860. At once there began
the most sober soul-searching, both North and South. At the instance of
Virginia, a Peace Convention was convoked in the City of Washington on
February 4, 1861.23 It was presided over by an ex-President of the United
States24 and was attended by representatives of twenty-one of the states then
still in the Union.25 It labored conscientiously to find a way out of the im-
broglio into which the states were drifting. Laboring, too, were members of
Congress. Although the Republicans had working control of the House of
Representatives by January 12, 1861, and of the Senate by February 4,
1861,26 the halls of Congress hardly breathed fire and brimstone in those
fateful days between December 1860 and April 1861. On the contrary there
was a sincere effort to achieve an accommodation between the sections
through a Committee of Thirteen in the Senate and a Committee of Thirty-
three in the House.27 Even Seward, the apostle of the Irrepressible Conflict,2 8
21 MCDOUGALL, FUGITIVE SLAVES (1891); HART, SLAVERY AND ABOLITION (1906); MUNFORD, op.
cit. supra note 4, at 201-13.
22 1 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 5 at 168-76, 301-02.
23 CRAFTS, OFICA.L JoURtN.L OF THE CONFERENCE CONVENTION 1 (1861).
24 Id. at 5-6.
25 Various sources give different numbers. The official journal, however, lists 21 States. Id. at
80-84. See also, CRITTENDEN, DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE PEACE CONVENTION, App. II,
456-66 (1864).
26 The 36th Congress met on Dec. 5, 1860, with 114 Republicans, 92 Democrats and 31 others
in the House and with 36 Democrats, 26 Republicans and four others in the Senate. BuEAu OF
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF Tan UNrrIE STATES 37 (1949). The Republicans gained control
of the House on Jan. 12, 1861, with the withdrawal of the Mississippi and South Carolina repre-
sentatives, leaving 114 Republicans in a 266-member House. In the Senate there were 26 Republican
Senators of a total of 54 (counting Texas Senators) by Feb. 4, 1861, when the last group of
Southern Senators withdrew from Congress prior to Sumter, there seems to be no evidence of
formal withdrawal of the Texas Senators. After Texas seceded from the Union on Feb. 1, 1861,
however, they do not appear to have been in attendance in the Senate. BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF
THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1949 at 121 (1950).
27 Numerous resolutions seeking an accommodation with the South were introduced in the 36th
Congress, most of which were referred to the two Committees. The main lines of compromise were:
(1) efforts to re-establish the Missouri Compromise line; (2) efforts to secure repeal of the personal
liberty laws enacted by Northern States; and (3) proposed constitutional amendments voicing the
principle of non-interference with slavery in the States where it existed. Chief among these re-
solutions were the Johnson Resolution, which incorporated points 1 and 2, and the Crittenden
Compromise which embraced all three. Neither was adopted. In the House, H.R. 80, based on the
Peace Convention Resolutions and substantially incorporating all three points, was whittled down to
a proposed constitutional amendment guaranteeing non-interference with slavery before the House
passed it by a vote of 133 to 65 on Feb. 28, 1861. 30 CONG. GLOBE 1285 (1861). It passed the
Senate by the bare two-thirds majority required (24 to 12) on Mar. 2, 1861, and was submitted to the
States for ratification. 30 CONG. GLOBE 1403 (1861).
It is significant that the Republicans for the most part refrained from making extremist speeches
during the debate on these compromise measures. Many leading Republicans openly sought
moderation. For example, on Jan. 10, 1861, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, a leading Republican,
supported a re-establishment of the discarded Missouri Compromise line, and promised that, under
Lincoln, the fugitive slave law would "probably . . . be more certainly enforced." 30 CONG. GLOBE
314 (1861). On Feb. 11, 1861, a compromise resolution, which reaffirmed the principle of non-
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became a champion of "utmost moderation, forbearance and conciliation. '29
On January 12, 1861, he told the Senate:
If misapprehension of my position needs so strong a remedy, I am
willing to vote for an amendment of the Constitution, declaring that it
shall not, by any future amendment, be so altered as to confer on
Congress a power to abolish [slavery] or interfere [with it] in any
State.30
And he held out his hand to the withdrawing Senators of seceded States:
I am for leaving these seats here for those Senators. . . to be resumed
at their own time and in their good pleasure.
3 1
On the day of South Carolina's secession Lincoln, in conference with
Thurlow Weed, drew up three resolutions for Weed to take to Washington
with Lincoln's thought that Seward should introduce them and that if "un-
animously supported by our friends" they "would do much good." The re-
solutions focused directly on the fugitive slave problem and the personal
liberty laws of Northern States. They provided for enforcement of the fugitive
slave clause of the Constitution by Congress and punishment of resistance
thereto; declared that all state laws in conflict with such a law of Congress
should be repealed; and proclaimed that the Union must be preserved. 2
Yet compromise efforts foundered. And one of the main reasons - per-
haps the principal one - was the northern extremists' refusal to abide by the
clear constitutional requirement for the return of fugitive slaves.33 It is most
likely that an acceptance of that obligation - which had been written in
most explicit terms into the Constitution - would have cut the ground from
under the southern secessionists, leaving the thin tier of the cotton states
without the support of the borderland region of North Carolina, Virginia,34
Tennessee, and Arkansas. Had this occurred, the government of Mont-
interference, was offered by Representative Palmer of New York, Republican and a long-time
champion of the suppression of the slave trade, and speedily adopted by the House by an over-
whelming majority of 116 to 4. 30 CoNG. GLOBE 855 (1861). As late as Mar. 2, 1861, Republican
Senator Baker of Oregon, who was to die in the war as a Union Army Major General, supported
H.R. 80 and pleaded that he had "an abiding hope" that the people of North Carolina "do not mean
to get out," and that he would vote for the Constitutional amendment "to allay your apprehensions"
that "we really do, in our secret hearts," intend to interfere with slavery in the States. 30 CoNG.
GLOaE 1366 (1861).
28 6 THE WORKS OF WILLAM H. SEwARD 292 (Baker ed., 1884).
29 30 CoNt. GLOBE 344 (1861).
30 Id. at 344.
31 Id. at 501.
32 HORNER, LTNCOLN AND GREELEY 199-201 (1953).
33 At least five compromise resolutions on the question of fugitive slaves were offered in the
House during the 36th Congress. None was adopted. On Mar. 1, 1861, however, the House passed
by a narrow margin a resolution reported by the Committee of Thirty-three. It would have put the
question exclusively in the hands of federal courts. 30 CONG. GLOBE 1327-28 (1861). The House-
passed bill died in the Senate. Id. at 1350. Also, attempts to secure repeal of personal liberty laws
as a part of general compromise resolutions failed. See note 27, supra.
34 In its resolution inviting the states to participate in a Peace Convention the General
Assembly of Virginia stated its opinion that the Crittenden Compromise (with minor modifications)
would "constitute the basis" for an adjustment of "the unhappy controversy which now divides the
States." CRrrrNDEN, op. cit. supra note 25 at 9-10. It would seem that the proposition for a revival
of the Missouri Compromise was largely symbolic - slavery in the Territories south of that line
almost certainly would have been of little practical importance. The really substantial proposition was
the full implementation of the right to the return of fugitive slaves as guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.
The advocacy, by Virginia, of a restoration of the Missouri Compromise suggests that the Dred
Scott decision, under which that Compromise would have been invalid, was of only limited significance
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gomery3 5 would soon have withered away. The Bonnie Blue Flag with but
seven stars could not have flown very long.
Even more foolish - if that is possible - were the extremists of the
South. There were four slave states that never seceded. At least two of them,
Missouri and Kentucky, and perhaps a third, Maryland, were natural allies
of the South. Their support was of critical importance to the South. With
them, the Confederacy had much better than a fighting chance. Without
them, the war was lost to the Confederacy before it began.
Lincoln understood this vital political fact.36 But the extremists of the
South were too intent upon full vindication of their position to be politically
smart. They let themselves be jockeyed by a master of county courthouse
politics into a position which forfeited the support of states without which
they could not win.
Missouri called a convention to consider its relations with the Nation
which met on February 28, 1861. Its 104 delegates were overwhelmingly
pro-South. They elected as their presiding officer Sterling Price,37 who was to
become a renowned general of the Confederate armies. Their speeches and
resolutions made it clear that, however attached they were to the Union, if a
war were brought on by the North they would feel compelled to go with the
South.3 8 Although they received the ambassador from seceded Georgia with
something less than enthusiasm,89 they were deeply conscious of the historic
ties that bound them Southward. In short, they were ripe for cultivation by
Montgomery.
Yet Montgomery, if it had heeded their speeches, should have known
that they had not blinded themselves to constitutional and political realities. 40
Even when they were recognizing their sisterhood with the other slave states,
they recognized, too, that Lincoln had taken an oath to support the Con-
stitution and that he had no choice but to endeavor to carry out at least his
minimum constitutional functions. 41 They might refuse to countenance the
use of force by the North to impose the constitutional duties upon the South,
in contributing to the final impasse between the States. Violently condemned in the North, even by
moderates, and ardently ambraced by Southern extremists, that decision doubtless did much to
exacerbate feeling. But the great likelihood is that, if the fugitive slave problem had been settled,
the question of slavery in the Territories could have been worked out to the satisfaction of the
border States without much regard to the apparent legal consequences of Dred Scott. Indeed it is
virtually certain that, if the war had been postponed by progress toward compromise satisfactory to
the border States, Dred Scott would soon have been modified or overruled.
35 The Montgomery government was established on the same day the Peace Convention assembled
in Washington, Feb. 4, 1861.
36 See Lincoln and the Border States, SMrrH, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. V, 141-61.
37 JOURNAL OF THE MISSOURI STATE CONVmNON 14 (1861).
38 Thus, a resolution offered by John T. Redd read in part:
"We deem it due to our Northern Brethren, to declare that it is the determination of the people of
Missouri, that in the event that any Southern State is invaded for the purpose of carrying [the
doctrine of coercion] in effect, to take their stand by the side of their Southern Brethren and resist
the invader at all hazards." Id. at 21. See also id. at 25-26, 29.
39 The resolution to receive the "Commissioner" was adopted by a vote of 62 to 35. PRoCED-
INGs OF THE MISSOURI STATE CONVENTION 13-17 (1861).
40 The delegates to the Convention took an oath "to support the Constitution of the United
States; and of the State of Missouri." JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 37 at 12.
41 See Report and Resolutions of the Committee on Federal Relations, id., at 34-37; Minority
Report of the Committee on Federal Relations, id., at 38-40. See also PROCEEDINGS, Op. cit. supra
note 39, at 38-43, 64-68, 77-80.
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but they were no less intolerant of the use of force by the South to frustrate
the efforts of the President to abide by his constitutional oath.4" Thus, the
convention's Committee on Federal Relations introduced a resolution stating
that:
... in the opinion of this Convention, the employment of military force
by the Federal Government to coerce the submission of the seceding
States, or the employment of force by the seceding States to assail the
government of the United States, will inevitably plunge this country
into civil war, and thereby extinguish all hope of an amicable settle-
ment of the fearful issues now pending before the county; we therefore
earnestly entreat, as well the Federal Government as the seceding States,
to withhold and stay the arm of military power, and on no pretense
whatever to bring upon the nation the horrors of civil war.43
The resolution was adopted, with an amendment, by an overwhelming
majority of 89 to 6. 44
This simple fact was ignored by the fire-eaters of the South. When
Lincoln, playing his game with foxy caution, merely sought to provide food
to the garrison of besieged Fort Sumter, the Confederate government at
Montgomery let Beauregard open the ball with blazing cannon.45 It gave old
man Ruffin a thrill, no doubt, to jerk the lanyard. 46 No doubt, too, it satisfied
Senator Wigfall's thirst for blood. 47 But it lost Missouri to the Confederacy.
When the Missouri convention, which had been adjourned, reassembled in
July 1861, 86 of its original 104 delegates appeared, 4s and overwhelmingly
they established a state government loyal to the Union.49
In the fire-eaters' mad attack on Sumter, Lincoln won the war. For,
whereas secession had not provoked the North to arms, armed defiance by
the South unified the North, alienated the critical area of Missouri and
Kentucky from the South's cause, ° gave western Virginia its long sought op-
portunity for breaking away from Richmond, 5 1 and assured that "Maryland,
My Maryland" would be but a romantic dream with a rude awakening at
Sharpsburg.
So the war came. It came because of foolish defiance of constitutional
obligation among the extremists of the North and foolish defiance of con-
42 See Majority Report, JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 37 at 34-36. See also PRocEEDINGs, op. cit.
supra note 39 at 5-6, 20-21, 30-31, 68, 173-75, 248-54.
43 JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 37 at 36.
44 The amendment recommended that the Federal Government withdraw its garrison at Fort
Sumter in order to save the country from the "ruins of Civil War" and restore "harmony and
fraternal feelings" between the two sections. Id. at 48-49.
45 6 CHANNiNG, Op. cit. supra note 10, at 312-13; SWANBERG, FIRST BLOOD, 291-98 (1957).
46 SWANBERo, op. cit. supra note 45, at 298.
47 Id. at 277-78.
48 The result of roll calls discloses that 86 delegates were present at one time or another during
the reconvened Convention. JOURNAL OF THE MISSOtR CONVmNrIoN (Reconvened) 9-10 (1861).
49 The convention declared vacant the offices of the governor, lieutenant-governor, secretary of
state, and members of the legislature and filled the executive offices with men of its own choosing.
Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative Union man who had worked for restoration of the Union by
compromises, was elected governor. JOURNAL, op. cit. supra note 48, at 20-22, 123-33 (1861).
50 SMrH, op. cit. supra note 5, at 263-312.
51 Id. at 185-220, 359-65.
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stitutional process among the extremists of the South.52 Both extremist ele-
ments were in the minority in their sections, but they had emotion and
hysteria on their side to silence the soberer counsels of the majority. The war
that few wanted, that most feared, was blunderingly brought upon the Nation.
Defiance of federal power in the North and in the South spelled the doom of
a happy land. And in the end, when battle flags were furled at Appomatox,
it was the South which lay in ruin, the victim of force begotten by force.
This chapter in our history settled once and for all the issue of the right
of self-determination, by a state, of the meaning of the constitutional compact.
In 1861 the compact theory became a mere historical speculation. Jefferson
Davis, in a land of free speech, could still write an impassioned two volumes
in its support twenty years later"3 but he wrote for antiquarians. From 1861
onward our band of states was a federal Nation.
I refer to this chapter in our history not to reopen old wounds. I refer
to it because it was the bitterest experience in our country's life. We should
have the wit to learn from that experience.
As the war has receded beyond the memories of the living, it has be-
come romanticized. Much is written of it today suggesting that it was a great
sporting event, a clash of knightly champions. In fact it was nothing of the
sort. It was bloody.
In all the major American wars, beginning with the Revolution and
coming on through the recent Korean conflict, excepting only the Civil
War, some 606,000 Americans lost their lives from battle and non-
battle causes. In the Civil War alone more than 618,000 American serv-
icemen lost their lives. In other words, more American servicemen
perished in the Civil War than in all our other wars combined. 54
The war was succeeded by a period of prostration in the South which threw
out of joint the whole future development of our economy; only in most
recent years has Southern industry finally approached a level of development
comparable to that of other sections. The South was denied its birthright,
because of the war and its inevitable aftermath, for the better part of a full
century.
Surely, from such a disaster, we are capable of learning the obvious
lesson that, ultimately, constitutional dispute must be settled, rightly or
wrongly, but settled nonetheless, by the federal agencies, which means in last
analysis by the Supreme Court.
But there is an even more pertinent lesson. The war came because
extremists North and South blindly insisted upon the fullest measure of their
respective positions. Each was firmly convinced that it was right and the
other was wrong. Each refused to give an inch.
52 Thomas Corwin, chairman of the Committee of Thirty-three created to find a compromise
between the sections, wrote to Lincoln on Jan. 16, 1861:
I cannot comprehend the madness of the times. Southern men are theoretically
crazy. Extreme Northern men are practical fools. The latter are really quite as mad as
the former. HoRNER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 201-02.
53 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 5.
54 Wiley, The Memorable War, 53 MIssouRi HSToiucAL REmw 99, 101 (1959).
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The northern extremists had mesmerized themselves into believing that
a conspiring slave power would spread slavery throughout the Nation if it
were not stifled.
55
The southern extremists, no less hysterical, had gradually beguiled
themselves, over a period of thirty years, into a persecution complex, con-
fident that the entire North was intent upon ruthless exploitation of the South
for the benefit of northern commerce through the tariff and other measures,
and finally through suppression of the South's "peculiar institution."56
We can see now how wrong both elements were - and how foolish
both were not to give an inch toward an accommodation that would have
been relatively easy to effect to the great benefit of each.
When we turn back to the present problem, the application of the lesson
of our bitterest experience becomes clear.
On nearly any phase of the race issue, the views of the most extreme
racist in the South are quite likely to find tolerance and even sympathy in a
substantial part of the rest of the country. That was certainly true in 1861,
even in Lincoln's home state. In the North today the evidence of sympathy is
still to be found on every hand. In the North there are still negro ghettoes.
There is even, in some quarters of the North, less than wholehearted accep-
tance of school desegregation. Moreover, there are thoughtful people aplenty
in the North even among those who fully accept racial equality who under-
stand that the South has a social problem that cannot be solved by a mere
edict of law. After all, it was a negro educator who recently said to Mr.
Harris Wofford, after having watched negro children entering a negro school
in the deep South:
I watched those little boys and girls, so many of them in dirty, ragged
clothes, carrying their shoes to put on when they went into the new
school building. I saw their uncombed tangled hair, and I remembered
the shacks and tenements and broken homes they had just come
from .... I knew that even one who believed in brotherhood, even
one who thought the Supreme Court was right, would look at those
little Negro children and say, 'No, not now, not with them, not my
child, not yet.'5
7
But what sincere and decent people of the South apparently do not
realize - what has been kept from them - is that once action is taken in
the South amounting to defiance of the Court or of other agencies of federal
power, whether it be United States marshals or the President himself, the
issue is shifted from the race issue to the issue of supremacy of law. And on
that issue an otherwise divided people will close ranks. That is exactly what
happened when Sumter was shelled. Little Rock should be sufficient warning
that the oath to support the Constitution that Lincoln took is still being
taken, and taken seriously, and the country will sustain the integrity of that
oath. He would be dull indeed who, upon reading our history, would assume
55 NYE, FETrRED FREEDOM 223-49 (1949); 1 MovasoN & CoMMAGER, THE GRowTH OF THE
REPUBLIC 606, 630-32 (4th ed., 1950); WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAvE
PowER (1877).
56 KETrLL, SOUTHERN WEALTH AND NORTHERN PROFITS (1860); HELPER, IMPENDING CRISES OF
THE SoUTH (1860); 6 CHANNING, op. cit. supra note 10, at 258-59.
57 Wofford, The Supreme Court as an Educator, Saturday Review, Mar. 7, 1959, pp. 13-14.
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that the Nation would long tolerate any action which subordinates the
federal law and its process to the will of a state or the defiance of a mob.
The good people of the South should be brought to an understanding
of a corollary fact of vital importance to them, in their own interest, if they
are really concerned about the dangers of integration. Today, under the
Court's decisions, and with the full support of public opinion in the rest of
the country, they have great room for maneuver, for delaying and minimiz-
ing integration, even for compromising the apparent breadth of the Court's
dicta. There is nothing in the rest of the country like the pre-Civil War
abolitionist societies of the North. On the contrary, there has been sur-
prisingly little excited interest in the other sections about the integration issue
in the South. There is too much glass in the walls of the house of the North to
warrant stone throwing, and the NAACP has been virtually alone in aggres-
sive steps. Outside the South public feeling is generally characterized by sheer
apathy among the great majority and a very deliberate judgment among a
more thoughtful minority that it is wiser to leave the South alone to work out
its own problem without "interference."
But this attitude could change, and a change could come more swiftly
than the South might presently think possible.
Suppose, for example, that extreme intransigence continues and that no
steps are taken - not even the most grudging - toward admission of some
negro children to the schools of the deep South. If this were to happen, every
lawyer in the country, including the Southland, knows that it is only a ques-
tion of time, and not such a long time at that, before some quite specific court
decrees will be entered. And every lawyer knows that if court decrees
multiply the risk grows that room for maneuver will be narrowed. Sooner or
later, if the authorities in the deep South do not take the initiative in taking
some steps looking to some apparent compliance to some degree with the
Court's decisions, judges are going to frame orders prescribing the steps to be
taken. Every southern lawyer knows, in his heart, that it is virtually certain
that such orders will go much further than is likely if the issue posed for
court decision is whether a particular step taken by the state authorities in
purported compliance with "integration" is sufficient.58
58 In the Brown decision, the Court recognized that 'Full implementation of these constitutional
principles may require solution of varied local school problems. School authorities have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing and solving these problems; courts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing con-
stitutional principle.' 349 U.S. 294, at 299. Later in the same decision, the Court points to circum-
stances which might lead a lower court to find that 'additional time is necessary to carry out the
ruling in an effective mannar.' Id., at 300. Courts are likely to be tolerant of an apparent step
toward integration; they cannot tolerate an obvious attempt to avoid any action in that direction.
History of the Aaron case amply illustrates this point. In 1956 the District Court found a plan for
desegregation of Little Rock schools, over a period of seven years to be a 'prompt and reasonable
start towards full compliance.' Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. Ark. 1956). The Court of
Appeals agreed. Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F. 2d 361, 363-64 (8th Cir. 1957). After the Little Rock
incident however, the District Court granted the school board's request for an order suspending the
integration plan until 1961 on the ground that to continue the plan would continue chaos and dis-
order without any resulting benefit to the negro children. Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.
Ark. 1958). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F. 2d 33 (8th Cir.
1958). The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeals. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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When judicial decrees are entered, public opinion in the other sections
of the Nation undoubtedly will be strongly behind their enforcement. For
then the issue is, not an aspect of racism, but the supremacy of the law. The
South, thinking it is fighting the battle of race, will find itself on different
terrain where it cannot possibly win.
Another factor in the present situation should be understood in the
South. Southern extremists have been enjoying something of an orgy of
accusation of conspiracy: a three-cornered conspiracy between the Supreme
Court Justices, the NAACP, and the Communists to undermine law and
order in the South. However seriously this extravagance may be entertained
in the South, it has been regarded with amused bewilderment elsewhere. It
is fair to say that thus far few people elsewhere have believed that those who
utter such nonsense have meant anything but a rhetorical exercise. But if it
is indeed the tactic of the southern extremists to seek to undermine con-
fidence in the Court by attacking that body as an agency of "the Communist
conspiracy," and if such attacks long continue, the apathy elsewhere in-
evitably will be stirred awake and extremism will breed extreme reaction. A
nation which would not sit still for a trifling with the Court by a President
whose popularity at the time knew scarcely any bounds - and at a time
when the Court had sunk to its lowest ebb in public esteem - will not
countenance much longer the puerile charges and innuendoes that some
southern demagogues have cast broadside.
A still further factor may effect a swing of opinion in other sections
toward hostility to the South. There is no question but that race discrimination
in the United States has done our nation incalculable harm in the struggle
with Communism throughout the world. Since the most critical theatre for
that struggle is among the non-white peoples of Asia - and the day when
Africa itself will become a vital arena seems to be fast approaching - what-
ever magnifies the color line in our nation drives allies from our side in the
world conflict. Mr. Nixon saw this happening in his world tour early in his
vice-presidency; it had been so compelling a factor that, on his return, he
spoke out plainly against race discrimination even when his party still had
high hopes of making permanent inroads in the South. 59 As the international
crisis spreads and deepens, more and more thoughtful people in other sec-
tions will become increasingly intolerant of a program of action in the South
perfectly calculated to serve the cause of the Soviets.
In short, the days when the deep South can continue a course of defiance
with the rest of the nation only vaguely annoyed and not really stirred to
counter-action are numbered. The tacticians of Southern intransigence are
not far from over-reaching themselves.
The good people of the South should understand, too, how baseless have
been some of the principal arguments against the Court's decisions where-
with some southern lawyers have joined in the fight on integration. There is
nothing wrong with criticism of the Supreme Court; there is, indeed, nothing
59 Address by Vice President Richard M. Nixon, Dec. 23, 1953, New York Times, Dec. 24,
1958, p. 3, col. 1.
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wrong with disagreement with the Supreme Court; but when lawyers seek to
contribute to the weakening of the Court's authority by pretending that
Brown v. Board of Education represents some unheard of seizure of power
by the Court on purely social grounds without regard to the law, they are
shamefully guilty of misleading the people of their states.
There have been two accusations leveled by lawyers or pseudo-lawyers
at the Court's decision in Brown which have been especially deceptive.
One is that the Court's decision is unconstitutional because it over-
ruled previous Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution.
I am aware of the contention that the Supreme Court had never held
that desegregated schools are constitutional, that Plessy v. Ferguson dealt
with a different question, and that Brown was a decision of a novel point.60
While it is familiar judicial technique to deem Plessy as having decided noth-
ing more than the specific question there presented, and so not to be con-
trolling upon the point at issue in Brown, candor should compel recognition
that the Supreme Court in Brown was departing from and rejecting a principle
which, a number of years earlier, had been deemed constitutionally proper -
the separate-but-equal principle.6"
But it is quite another thing to take the further step, taken by some
southern legalists, and assure the public that the Supreme Court's departure
from precedent shows it to be an unconstitutional usurper.62 In the first place
overruling of past decisions is almost as old as our judicial system itself.
3
60 Recently Attorney General Rogers has taken the position that the Brown case had been
"foreshadowed" by a series of cases holding that separate educational facilities did not provide equal
educational opportunities. Address of William P. Rogers delivered before the Los Angeles Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association, 45 A.B.A.J. 23-24 (1959). This position has been re-
jected by a noted southern lawyer. BLOCH, The School Segregation Cases: A Legal Error That
Should Be Corrected, 45 A.B.A.J. 29 (1959).
61 It seems quite unrealistic to maintain that Brown was not upsetting prior law when one notes
the other situations in which the courts, since Brown, have rejected segregation: public beaches and
bathhouses, Dawson v. Baltimore, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877
(1955); public golf courses, Holmes v. Atlanta, 124 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ga. 1954), afl'd 223 F. 2d
93 (5th Cir. 1955), vacated per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); state parks, Tate v. Dept. of Con-
servation, 133 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 838 (1956); government restaurants, Plummer v. Casey, 148 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1955),
aff'd, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957); buses, Browder v. Gayle, 142
F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), rehearing denied 352 U.S. 955
(1956); sports events, Dorsey v. State Athletic Commission, 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958),
aff'd per curiam, No. 787, U.S.Sup.Ct, May 27, 1959 (27 U.S.L. WFEK 3337).
62 A recent article on the Brown decision by a southern lawyer is notable for its restraint.
Bloch, op. cit. supra note 60. In spite of his restraint, however, Mr. Bloch expresses "shock" at the
fact that the Brown case represents an "overruling" of a prior decision. Id., at 28-30. Yet, he goes
on to suggest that the South should seek to have the Brown decision overruled and that there is ample
precedent for overruling of past decisions by the Court. Id., at 98-99.
63 The earliest instance I have been able to find in the Supreme Court is Gordon v. Ogden, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 32 (1830), which overruled Wilson v. Daniel, 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 400 (1798). For
tabulations of Supreme Court decisions overruling earlier cases see Brandeis, J., dissenting in
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 408 (1932); SHARP, Movement in Supreme
Court Adjudication, 46 HiARv. L. Rav. 361, 593, 795 (1933); DOUGLAS, Stare Decisis, 49 COL. L.
REv. 735, App. A and B (1949). The lists grow longer if one adds those cases where the Court
departs radically from doctrines or rules set forth in earlier decisions "without specific overruling
or qualification of the earlier cases." Brandeis, J., dissenting in the Coronado Case, 285 U.S. 393, at
408.
Mr. Justice Douglas points out in his article that during the thirty years between 1860 and 1890,
the Supreme Court in 18 instances overruled controlling precedents. In 10 of these cases the Courf
was unanimous. In 13 of the overruled cases the Court had been unanimous. Eight of the 18 cases
involved constitutional questions. A noted example is the Legal Tender Cases where the Court
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In the second place there has always been a recognition that a decision on a
constitutional question does not have the same compulsion as a precedent for
the future as decisions in other areas may have.14 This is entirely logical, for
constitutional error is not easily corrected - whereas other errors can readily
be set right by action of the legislative branch.
Moreover the Southern legalists who assure their people that the Court
unconstitutionally usurped power because it departed from a precedent of
years past are playing fast and loose when they fail to explain that, if they
were right, much of the South's welfare today would be founded on uncon-
stitutional usurpation. Had the Court adhered to universally accepted con-
ceptions of the limits of the commerce clause, much of the underpinning of
the South's prosperity today - not to say that of other sections - would
long since have been swept away. The lawyer who genuinely believes it when
he says that the Court cannot constitutionally depart from the constitutional
views of its predecessors has never studied constitutional law.
The other favorite accusation of southern legalists is that the Court defied
the law, in Brown, by basing its decision upon sociological treatises instead of
upon legal principle. There must be many thousands of good people in the
South who have been misled by this canard.
The Court that decided Brown did not invent the practice of consulting
and citing non-legal treatises. A great many constitutional questions depend
upon the social and economic facts. In Brown the question was whether
separate-but-equal school facilities were in fact a reasonable recognition of
the constitutionally required equality of privilege. To examine the facts was
no more startling or innovating in that case than was a similar examination
of facts a century before when, in The License Cases,65 the Court was called
upon to determine the constitutionality of laws passed by various New
England states restricting the sale of liquor. Just as counsel for the negro
children in Brown relied on social facts to support his argument, so did
counsel for the states in The License Cases. He argued:
reversed its decision of the previous year and held that tender of federal notes was enough to satisfy
debts contracted before federal notes were made legal tender. 12 Wall. 457 (1870), overruling
Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (1869). In 1880 the Court rejected a 59-year old precedent and
held that Congress had no power to convict for contempt incurred by refusal to obey an order in a
congressional investigation. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), overruling Anderson v.
Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (1821). Douglas, op. cit. supra note 63, at 739-43. More recently, in 1938, the
Court discarded the concept of federal common law and overruled a century-old precedent. Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). In 1944 the
Court reversed a 75-year old stand and held that insurance was "commerce". United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), overruling Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868).
64 As early as 1848 Taney, C. J., in the Passenger Cases, gave this view as classical expression.
He stated: "After such opinions, judicially delivered, I had supposed that question to be settled, so
far as any question upon the construction of the Constitution ought to be regarded as closed by the
decision of this court. I do not, however, object to the revision of it, and am quite willing that it be
regarded hereafter as the law of this court, that its opinion upon the construction of the Con-
stitution is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been founded in error, and that
its judicial authority should hereafter depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is
supported." 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849). For more recent expressions of the rule see Brandeis,
3., dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1931); Reed, J., Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665-66 (1944); DOUGLAS, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. RaV. 735, 736-37
(1949).
65 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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The train of evils which mark the progress of intemperance is too
obvious to require comment. It brings with it degradation of character,
impairs the moral and physical energies, wastes the health, increases
the number of paupers and criminals, undermines the morals, and sinks
its victims to the lowest depths of vice and profligacy. 66
And he proceeded to cite statistics showing the incidence of alcoholism among
paupers, convicts and persons in poor-houses. Though Mr. Justice Grier, in
a concurring opinion upholding the constitutionality of the legislation, did not
think it necessary to "array the appalling statistics of misery, pauperism and
criminality which have their origin in the use or abuse of ardent spirits," he
was nonetheless aware of them.
67
A state prohibition against negro children's attendance at white schools
is no more immune to judicial scrutiny of the social facts bearing upon its
reasonableness than is a state prohibition of the sale of intoxicating beverage.
When, in 1887, the Court considered the constitutionality of the Kansas
Prohibition Act it had to examine the social facts just as it did in Brown when
it considered the constitutionality of the Kansas prohibition of integrated
schools. It said, in 1887, that, "Not every statute enacted ostensibly for the
promotion of [the public morals, health and safety] is to be accepted as a
legitimate exertion of the police powers of the state," that the courts "are
under a solemn duty" to "look at the substance of things. 6 8 And it proceeded
to examine the social facts. In upholding the prohibition it pointed out that
it could not
shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public
health, the public morals and the public safety may be endangered by
the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact, established by
statistics accessible to everyone, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism
and criminality existing in the country are, in some degree at least,
traceable to this evil.69
As social legislation increased, so did the necessity for the Court to
make findings of social fact. In Holden v. Hardy,70 the Court upheld the
constitutionality of an act passed by the Utah legislature regulating hours of
employment in underground mines, after first satisfying itself that mining
conditions were different from working conditions in other industries.71 Eight
years later, the Court found quite the opposite to be true of the baking
industry:
In looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations,
it may be true that the trade of baker does not appear to be as healthy
as some other trades, but it is also vastly more healthy than still others.
To the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been
regarded as an unhealthy one.72
The minority view expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan, for himself and Justices
White and Day, sets forth a lengthy review of treatises and statistics showing
66 Id. at 521.
67 Id. at 631.
68 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
69 Id. at 662.
70 169 U.S. 366 (1897).
71 Id. at 395-97.
72 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).
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that the baking trade was, quite to the contrary, an extremely unhealthy one.73
Louis D. Brandeis, in his appearances before the Court as an attorney,
turned the use of non-legal works into an art. The classic instance is Muller v.
Oregon,74 where the Court, sustaining the constitutionality of an Oregon
statute regulating hours of work for women, relied on Mr. Brandeis' brief
for its detailed citation of treatises, medical opinions and legislation pointing
to the social necessity for limiting women's hours of work. Since Muller v.
Oregon, the Court often has referred to treatises, texts and statistics in passing
upon the constitutionality of both state and federal action. 5
In short, the good people of the South should understand that they are
being hoaxed when they are told that the Court departed from its judicial
role by opening its eyes to the teachings of non-legal works. One legitimately
can argue that the Court misinterpreted the treatises, or that it failed to
consult other equally persuasive works with a contrary message. But wholly
spurious is the view that it is unlegal to seek out the social facts bearing upon
school desegregation. No lawyer worth his salt in any part of the country would
have the slightest hesitation to marshal non-legal treatises in support of his
cause whenever he felt they aided his argument.
In the South's own interest, it should see through the delusion that it can
defy the Court. It should plot another course of action while it has the chance
- before it is put in the strait-jackets of ever stricter judicial decrees and has
lost the understanding tolerance of public opinion in other sections of the
land. The South in 1860 and early 1861 was in a strong position - so
strong that it could have won much of its program had a less extreme leader-
ship appeared to chart a moderate course. That did not happen; and in 1865
the South was prostrate. Obviously a century later there is no danger of
anything as catastrophic as a civil war; but alienation of public opinion in
other sections of the land could quickly lead to many legislative, judicial, and
executive measures which would deprive the South of much of the local free-
dom it enjoys today.
There are signs that moderates in the South are beginning to be heard
and that there is a dawning awareness of the futility of massive resistance. To
these signs the favored response of the extremists - when outright suppression
fails - is that the public schools will be abolished. In this Symposium Dr.
Mollegen has soberly warned of the distressing likelihood of such an abolition.
I am not sure that the danger of public school abolition is as serious as
it might at first appear.
There is no gainsaying the tragedy to a given community or state of the
wiping out of public schools. The tragedy would be of such proportions that
it is very difficult to imagine. But I wonder whether it really could occur -
or be seriously attempted - in more than perhaps five states: South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana. In two or three of the other
73 Id. at 70-71.
74 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
75 See Notes, 61 HARv. L. REv. 692 (1948); 49 HARv. L. REv. 631 (1936); 36 COLUm. L. Rav. 283
(1936); BULE, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of
Legislative Action, 38 HARv. L. RFv. 6 (1924).
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states, to be sure, there has been much talk of such a step, and no doubt there
will be still more talk and perhaps even some moves to that end. But the
likelihood of such a drastic step on a large scale seems fairly remote except
possibly in the five states mentioned. In at least one of those states there is
at least one city - Atlanta, Georgia - which is such a progressive and vital
metropolis that, despite the rural rule in its legislature to which Mayor
Hartsfield has referred, it is hardly conceivable that school abolition could be
effectuated.
But even if public school abolition were to occur in those states, it is
doubtful that it would last very long. In the first place there is no question but
that the courts would finally forbid any semblance of state aid to segregated
private education by tuition grants or other subterfuge. Undoubtedly at the
moment the delusion fostered in the South has included an impression thai
the decisions of the Court can be circumvented by such devices, but a Court
which, even before Brown, had forbidden the "private" white primary76 will
not tolerate any kind of state aid to the furthering of "private" school
segregation. So the immediate prospect of the people in states abolishing the
schools - when they awake from their delusion - is that the rich, who can
pay for private education, will get it and the great masses of medium and low
income will be left without.
Nor will a school-less state be able to attract industry or commercial
enterprise. A South on the threshold of great economic development will find
itself grinding to a halt. The likelihood is slim that states with the resources
and the potential of Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana would shut the door
for any appreciable length of time on the expanding business prospects which
they are so favorably situated to enjoy.
Moreover, states which destroy public education would be no more
welcome to the rest of the nation than states which foster disease and crime.
No course would be better calculated to incite the rest of the nation to curtail
if not cut off the various forms of federal aid - highway grants, location of
federal enterprise, promotion of TVA, letting of government contracts, and so
on - which play such an important part in the economic life of any single
state today. Public education, one of the most distinctive contributions of
American society, cannot be obliterated in a Southern state without finally
raising the searching question: shall the rest of the nation lend its support to
a people choosing to make its children ignorant? It would not take many years
for that question to receive a negative answer. The states choosing the path
of ignorance would soon find themselves sealed off from federal supports, for
taxpayers elsewhere would not acquiesce in extending help to those who refuse
to take the most elementary steps to help themselves.
As I see it, the threat to avoid integration by eliminating schools is
essentially a pipe dream, in the long view. I can imagine it coming for a time.
I cannot imagine it lasting. The few states which might try it would have much
less chance of holding to it than the original Confederacy of seven states had
76 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
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of surviving as an independent nation if they had been left alone. They at
least had the hope of support from abroad; states attempting to secede from
the American system of public education would have no support anywhere,
at home or abroad.
Therefore, I doubt the need to be particularly concerned over the
question whether it would be constitutionally possible to compel a state to
provide public schooling. The southern extremists, with triumphant glee,
advance the proposition that the court cannot compel them to provide
schools. And some of the advocates of integration study with worried care
possible constitutional theories to support such compulsion. Such theories are
at hand as contemplation of the logic of the white primary decisions will
suggest.77 But I think that long before it becomes necessary to try out that
issue in the courts, school abolition will have proved to be a form of slow but
inexorable suicide which even the most deluded people will finally reject. I,
for one, would be inclined to let the erring sisters have a belly full of the
suicide, and see what happens, before becoming concerned with means to
apply the Constitution to force a state to provide schools.
In the meantime states neighboring the extreme intransigeants are
demonstrating both that many of the terrors of integration are imagined 78 and
that the "delibrate speed" enjoined by the Court gives abundant leeway for
77 In 1927 the Court held that the Texas statute which prohibited negro participation in
Democratic primaries denied equal protection of laws to a Negro. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927). The Court did not consider the fifteenth amendment. The Texas legislature then passed a
new law which authorized party committees to determine who may vote in primary elections. The State
Democratic party promptly adopted a rule which excluded Negroes from the 1928 primary. The
Court again held that the statute violated the equal protection clause since the statute authorized
the discrimination. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). In 1932 the State Democratic convention
adopted a resolution excluding Negroes from membership. The Court held a Negro was not denied
any right under the fourteenth amendment since the white primary was not the result of state action,
direct or indirect. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). Six years later, however, the Court
decided that a primary election was an integral part of a general congressional election. United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). The Classic case obviously cast doubt on the Grovey rule,
and, three years later, the Grovey case was overruled. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). There
the Court for the first time invoked the fifteenth amendment to strike down white primaries once
and for all.
The Court also has stated in a recent case: "The Constitutional rights of the children not to be
discriminated against in school admission on grounds of race or color declared by this Court in
the Brown case can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or
judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether
attempted 'ingeniously or ingenuously."' Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958).
78 There is a striking contrast between the trouble at Little Rock and the course of desegregation
in law schools which had been well under way, by virtue of court decision and otherwise, prior to
the Brown case. Admission of Negroes to a number of law schools in the South proceeded with
extraordinary smoothness. Leflar, Desegregation in Law Schools, 43 A.B.A.J. 145 (1957). Of
particular interest is the fact that the University of Arkansas admitted a Negro to its law school,
without litigation, as early as January, 1948. Professor Leflar, who was then dean of that law school,
states that, "a measure of segregation within the law school was at first enforced but broke down
under pressures exerted by the white students." Id., at 146. The nature of this breakdown is significant.
Originally there was only one negro student who was taught in a class by himself, and the plan had
been to keep Negroes in separate classes. The white students, however, realizing the superiority of
small-group instruction, sought admission to the "Negro" class which led to the breakdown in
segregated classes. It would be foolish, of course, to suggest that the problems of integration at the
law school level are the same as those in elementary and secondary schools, particularly in view of
the relatively few Negroes asking or eligible for law school admission. Nonetheless the relative ease
of desegregation in a number of southern law schools strongly suggests that serious difficulty in the
lower schools, at least when only a few Negroes are involved, could be avoided, and, indeed, is
contrived. This suggestion, of course, is abundantly supported by experience in a number of those
southern states where integration in the lower schools has proceeded to a significant extent.
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softening compromise and even for procrastination. Dr. Carmichael rightly
characterized that phrase in the Court's opinion as a flash of statesmanship. To
persons unfamiliar with the ways of the law and of judges it may seem strange
that courts would be so ready to blink at dragging feet if only the toes are
pointed in the desired direction. But lawyers - including Southern lawyers
- know that judges are masters of the art of compromise. With blood pres-
suring frustration, every lawyer has experienced in courts high and low the
tendency to let both sides win. This tendency, moreover, is often most pro-
nounced when the question to be decided is one highly charged with political
emotion. It was in the courthouse that Lincoln learned his politics, the
politics of compromise, of inconsistency, of gradualism. And long before
Lincoln, John Marshall had demonstrated how it is possible to win by giving
in.79
So, as the experience of the "border states" has shown, the Court's
decision and the slow and localized process it decreed for effectuating the
principle of its decision provide an unhappy South with the widest possible
latitude. Indeed the decision clearly demands very little more than an
abandonment of massive resistance; beyond that little is clear except that it
has provided the maximum opportunity for men of sincerity to work out
their problems in their own way.
But judges are human, and like other humans they can lose patience.
I have already suggested that the tactics of the southern extremists can easily
lead to tougher and tougher decrees which finally could destroy the latitude
the Court provided in Brown. Surely there are men of good will in the Soutli
who can see the dangers ahead if leadership is left to the demagogues.
Surely there are lawyers in the South who know that those words of Lee
who, in the late evening of his life, spoke so wisely:
It should be the object of all to avoid controversy, to allay passion,
[and] give full scope to reason and every kindly feeling.8 O
Surely there are lawyers in the South who know that those words of Lee
expressed the spirit of the law: avoid controversy by compromise; let passion
be tamed by the realism of reason.
79 Dosow, HISrORIC OPINIONS OF THE U.S. SuPREnsE CoURT 3-5 (1935), discussing Marbury
v. Madison.
s0 4 FREEMAN, R. E. LEE 483 (1935).
